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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMITATIONS OF
WISCONSIN MUNICIPALITIES - A SURVEY
Since 1951 and especially during the last three years, the Wisconsin
legislature has passed an abundance of legislation concerning consti-
tutional municipal debt limitations. This significant increase in legis-
lation in this area necessitates a historical analysis of the constitu-
tional provisions governing this matter, a review of the judicial in-
terpretations construing the constitution, and an explanation of the
position of Wisconsin. It is, however, not within the scope of this
article to discuss whether the applicable percentage limitations are
appropriate.
HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
Prior to 1874, the applicable provision of the Wisconsin constitu-
tion, Art. XI, sec. 3, read as follows:
It shall be the duty of the legislature, and they are hereby em-
powered, to provide for the organization of cities and in-
corporated villages, and to restrict their power of taxation,
assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts and loaning
their credit, so as to prevent abuses in assessments and taxa-
tion, and in contracting debts by such municipal corporations.
The power of the various municipal corporations to tax, assess,
borrow money, contract debts and loan their credit was usually not
expressly limited by the legislature, with the result that vast debts
were incurred and payment was left for succeeding generations.
When these later generations came into being, they also incurred debts
and, therefore, debt was imposed upon debt and an overwhelming bur-
den was placed on posterity.
Most of the early municipal obligations arose after the Civil War
from the purchase of railroad stock. Although such purchases may
have been necessary, the municipalities had little available revenues
remaining to carry on their ordinary municipal affairs. Some effective
restraint was deemed necessary.1 Art. VIII, sec. 6 of the constitution,
which limited the amount of debts of the state so that they would
never in the aggregate exceed $100,000, was held inapplicable to
municipal corporations.' Thus, in 1874, Art. XI, sec. 3 was amended
in an attempt to remedy the situation:
'The need for restraint on the power of municipalities to incur debts was
recognized by Thomas Jefferson: "The principle of spending money to be
paid by posterity, under the name of funding, is but swindling futurity on a
large scale. . . . To preserve our independence, we must not let our rulers
load us with perpetual debt. We must make our election between economy
and liberty, or profusion and servitude .... I place economy among the first
and most important of republican virtues, and public debt as the greatest of
dangers to be feared." 15 McQUILLAN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS §41.02 (3d
ed. 1950).2 State el rel. Dean v. The Common Council of the City of Madison, 7 Wis.
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No county, city, town, village, school district, or other municipal
corporation shall be allowed to become indebted in any manner
or for any purpose to any amount, including existing indebted-
ness, in the aggregate exceeding five per centum on the value
of the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last
assessment for state and county taxes previous to the incurring
of such indebtedness. Any county, city, village, school district,
or other municipal corporation incurring any indebtedness as
aforesaid, shall, before or at the time of doing so, provide for
the collection of a direct annual tax sufficient to pay the interest
on such debt as it falls due, and also to pay and discharge the
principal thereof within twenty years from the time of con-
tracting the same.3
Except for two amendments which did not affect the percentage
limitation,4 the provisions in Art. XI, sec. 3 regarding debt limits re-
mained unchanged for fifty-eight years. In 1932,5 an amendment
prompted by case law (to be considered later) provided that "an
indebtedness created for the purpose of purchasing, acquiring, leasing,
constructing, extending, adding to, improving, conducting, controlling,
operating or managing a public utility of a town, village or city, and
secured solely by the property or income of such public utility, and
whereby no municipal liability is created, shall not be considered an
indebtedness of such town ...." Then, in 19516 the provision was again
amended to provide that "for any city which is authorized to issue
bonds for school purposes the total indebtedness of such city shall
not exceed in the aggregate eight per centum of the value of such
property." In 1955,1 the value of the taxable property, in the case of
school districts and cities authorized to issue bonds for school pur-
poses, was thereafter to be determined "by the value of such property
as equalized for state purposes . .. as provided by the legislature."
In 1960,s "counties having a population of 500,000 or over" were
also able to have their debt limitations determined by the value of
property as equalized for state purposes. Finally, in 1961,D it was pro-
vided that "for any school district offering no less than grades one
to twelve and which is at the time of incurring such debt eligible for
the highest level of school aids, the total indebtedness of such school
688 (1858). A "qualitative" restraint was imposed in Foster v. City of Keno-
sha, 12 Wis. 616 (1860), where the court held that the municipality could
tax only for a "legitimate municipal purpose."
3 Wis. LAwS 1872, J.R. 11, Wis. LAWs 1873, J.R. 4, Wis. LAWS 1874, ch. 37,
vote, Nov. 1874.
4 Wis. LAWS 1909, J.R. 44, V/is. LAWS 1911, J.R. 42, Wis. LAws 1911, ch. 665,
vote, Nov. 1912; Wis. LAWs 1921, J.R. 398, Wis. LAWS 1923, J.R. 34, iVis.
LAWS 1923, ch. 203, vote, Nov. 1924.
5 Wis. LAWS 1929, J.R. 74, Wis. LAWS 1931, J.R. 71, vote, Nov. 1932.6 Wis. LAWS 1949, J.R. 12, Wis. LAWS 1951, J.R. 6, vote, April 1951.
7 WIs. LAws 1953, J.R. 47, Wis. LAws 1955, J.R. 12, vote, April 1955.8 Wis. LAws 1957, J.R. 59, Wis. LAWS 1959, J.R. 32, vote, Nov. 1960..
9 Wis. LAws 1959, J.R. 35, Wis. LAWS 1961, J.R. 8, vote, April 1961.
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district shall not exceed ten per centum of the value of such property
as equalized for state purposes."
Three proposed amendments received their first passage in the
recent legislative term (passage in the next legislative term and a
majority vote of the people of the state being necessary under Art. XII,
sec. 1 for such amendments to become a part of the constitution). The
first provides that in all cases, the value of the taxable property "as
equalized for state purposes" shall be used to determine the permissible
debt limitation.' The second purports to simplify the language of
Art. XI, sec. 3 and to increase the per centum of debt of cities author-
ized to issue bonds for school purposes."- It reads:
No county, city, town, village, school district or other municipal
corporation may become indebted in an amount that exceeds an
allowable percentage of the taxable property located therein
equalized for state purposes as provided by the legislature. In
all cases the allowable percentage shall be five per centum ex-
cept as follows: (a) For any city authorized to issue bonds for
school purposes, an additional ten per centum shall be permitted
for school purposes only, and in such cases the territory attached
to the city for school purposes shall be included in the total
taxable property supporting the bonds issued for school pur-
poses. (b) For any school district which offers no less than
grades one to twelve and which at the time of incurring such
debt is eligible for the highest level of school aids, ten per
centum shall be permitted.
The third proposed amendment is intended to alleviate the problems
caused by recent changes in the types of property subject to property
taxation.
12
JUDICIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE PROVISION
The language of the 1874 amendment seemed unambiguous; ap-
plication of its terms seemed relatively easy, and accomplishment of
its purposes seemed possible. The first case to consider and apply this
amendment was optimistic about its effectiveness, but cautioned:
[I]t is inconceivable how diverse opinions can be formed of its
meaning; but the scrutiny, ingenuity and ability for critical
analysis of the bar may hereafter discover some possible mean-
ing beyond what now appears to be so clearly expressed. Argu-
ments of convenience, of policy, or of present necesssity, should
lo Wis. LAWS 1961, J.R. 58.
11 Wis. LAWS 1961, J.R. 71.
12Wis. LAWS 1961, J.R. 91. The amendment provides that after January 1,
1964, the local debt limits shall be determined by dividing the percent by a
fraction determined as follows: Denominator, 1963 state equalized value of
property in government unit; numerator, 1963 equalized value less the 1963
equalized value of merchants' stock-in-trade, manufacturers' materials and
finished products, livestock and other categories of personal property that
were assessable in 1963 but exempted in 1964 and thereafter.
13 Hebard v. Ashland County, 55 Wis. 145, 147, 12 N.W. 437 (1882).
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not be allowed, by loose construction, to weaken the force or
limit the extent of a constitutional prohibition so necessary and
so beneficially intended. 3
Another early decision cited with approval cases from other jurisdic-
tions which held that similar provisions were to be strictly construed,
regardless of the purpose for which the debt was incurred: "'When
such constitutional limit had been reached, the municipality is pro-
hibited from making any contract whereby an indebtedness is created,
even for the necessary current expenses in the administration of the
affairs and government of the corporation.' "314
The first few cases to construe this amendment evinced a strong
desire to apply the provision strictly. Perhaps the memory of the
degenerate state of municipal finances still lingered in the courts'
minds; perhaps the newness of the provision prompted a close ad-
herence to its terms. At any rate, few loopholes were allowed. But
as time passed, municipal needs became greater and municipal costs
began to skyrocket. The net result-the situation cautioned against
in the Hebard decision,1 5 that "the scrutiny, ingenuity and ability for
critical analysis of the bar may hereafter discover some possible
meaning beyond what now appears to be so clearly expressed," soon
appeared in order to alleviate the municipality's dilemma. To best
discuss this situation, the cases that have considered this constitutional
provision will be grouped into various categories.
I. When indebtedness incurred
In Earles v. Wells,1 6 the court approved an Illinois case holding that
"'indebtedness will be regarded as having been incurred from the date
of the contract, and not postponed to the time of the completion and
acceptance of the work.' "17
In State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. Ry. Co. v. Tomahawk Common
Council,' the city contracted to buy stock in the railroad, but condi-
tioned on the completion of the road and the legal capacity of the
city at that time to become indebted. The court stated that "The phrases
'incurring such indebtedness,' and 'incurring any indebtedness as
aforesaid,' manifestly refer to the time when the contract is performed
by the acts of the company. . . . To incur an indebtedness is to be-
come liable for or subject to an indebtedness."1 9 Thus, by placing a
condition in the contract, the rule of the Earles case was avoided.
The problems involved in allowing the Tomahawk situation to
14 Earles v. Wells, 94 Wis. 285, 297, 68 NAV. 964 (1896).
15 Hebard v. Wells, supra note 13.
16 94 Wis. 285, 68 N.W. 964 (1896).
17 Id. at 297-8.
1s96 Wis. 73, 71 NW. 86 (1897).
29 Id. at 91.
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stand were seen in Crogster v. Bayfield County. 0 In this case, the
court held that to allow the indebtedness to arise when the contract
obligation or a part thereof was completed by the contractor would
be to sanction a juggling of assessments. Since the contract was in
existence and payment on it depended on whether the city was
legally able to incur indebtedness, assessments could be manipulated
to secure a favorable contract or to avoid an unfavorable one. Thus,
the bondholder would be placed in a very tenuous position and munici-
pal bonds would lose their attractiveness. The court determined that
the problem would best be solved by using the last assessment before
the execution of the contract to determine whether the debt limit would
be exceeded. This would allow the parties to know in advance whether




The Crogster decision was distinguished in Janes v. City of Racine 2 2
where the court was dealing with the city's purchase of an existing
waterworks plant. Since such a purchase was governed by the Public
Utility Act,23 the court held that the transaction for the purchase of the
20 99 Wis. 1, 74 N.W. 635, 77 N.W. 167 (1898).
21 It is interesting to note that in the Crogster decision the court found that the
contract was severable and held that all parts of the contract were valid
except the ones that would bring the city's indebtedness over the debt limita-
tion. This severability doctrine was also followed in Herman v. City of
Oconto, 110 Wis. 660, 86 N.W. 681 (1901). Quaere: What happens to the
last part of the contract, the part held void, especially if it covers an es-
sential element of that for which the contract was made? That element is
still needed and thus an uncontracted indebtedness of the city is created
for future generations.
In regard to this re-contracting or ratification of the void part of a con-
tract, Riesen v. School District, 189 Wis. 607, 208 N.W. 472 (1926), imposes
a limitation. There the electors of the school district ratified the contract the
following year, at a time when the amount authorized to be paid did not ex-
ceed the constitutional limit. The court held that no action could be taken to
enforce payment under this ratification, since the contract was void ab initio
and could not be ratified. The court, however, added: "We may suggest,
however, that another and interesting question would be presented were the
electors of the school district, solely in recognition of their moral obliga-
tion to pay for the school building, to take appropriate action in that behalf
at a time when to do so would not be in violation of the constitutional pro-
vision we are considering." Id. at 613-14. The court did not rule on this pos-
sibility, but merely wondered if, at a time when the electors could not be
said to have been influenced by the specter of a void contract, they could
compensate a contractor for the improvements which they presently enjoyed
and for which they paid nothing.
The fact that there can be no ratification of a contract which would cause
the municipality to exceed its constitutional limitation of indebtedness im-
poses a necessary burden on the one dealing with the municipality to make
sure that the contract will be a valid one. In this regard, see: School District
v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank of Milwaukee, 9 Wis. 2d 400, 101 N.W. 2d
112 (1960)... not only can the contract not be ratified, but there also can be
no recovery of principles of unjust enrichment. Shulse v. City of Mayville,
223 Wis. 624, 271 N.W. 643 (1937).
22 155 Wis. 1, 143 N.W. 707 (1913).




plant was not complete in all its essential details until the commission
filed its certificate. The commission made a determination of the proper
price to be paid for the utility, and thus there could be no way of
knowing whether the purchase price exceeded the constitutional debt
limitation until that price was determined.
II. Lease-financing
The Earles v. Wells decision 24 also curtailed an attempted scheme
to by-pass the strictness of the provision. There the city needed a
waterworks system and made a contract to have fire hydrants con-
structed and rented to the city. The lease was to last twenty years
and the rent was to be paid from tax receipts. The city issued bonds
to the contractor and these bonds were to be paid off by the rental
payments. At the end of the lease period, the city was to become the
owner of the hydrants. The court saw through this evasive method and
considered it merely an indirect way of expressly agreeing to pay the
principal and interest on the bonds. The lease-financing agreement
was rejected and the total contract price was used to determine whether
the city had exceeded the constitutional limitation.
The Earles case was distinguished in Stedman v. City of Berlin-5
In the latter case the contract called for the construction of a water-
works system which was to be rented for a period of thirty years, the
rent to be paid from tax receipts. The contract also provided that the
city had an option to purchase the waterworks system at any time
within six months of its completion. An attempt to void this contract
was thwarted because the court was unwilling to consider the total
rental payments as indebtedness during the year of executing the con-
tract. Only the yearly rental payments were held to constitute in-
debtedness. Rejecting the Earles v. Wells rationale, the court held that
as the city had simply stipulated for an option to buy, it was under no
obligation to buy the waterworks. The plaintiff also contended that
there was a secret agreement that the city would become the owner
after the thirty year period, but the court held that there were not
enough facts pleaded to establish such a contention.2 .
A bit more complicated method of lease-financing was attempted in
State ex rel. Rogers v. Milligan.2 7 In this case, pursuant to statute,28
the school district board was authorized to lease and re-lease district
lands and improvements to a nonprofit sharing corporation. As a con-
dition of the lease of lands to such corporation, the corporation had
to construct a new school building and finance its cost by a mortgage of
24 Earles v. Wells. 94 Wis. 285, 68 N.W. 964 (1896).
25 97 Wis. 505, 73 N.W. 57 (1897).
26 Quaere: What would the contractor do with the hydrants after the lease ex-
pires and what would the city do without them?
27 267 Wis. 549, 66 N.W. 2d 326 (1954).
28 WIs. STAT. §40.035 (1953), repealed in 1955.
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the corporation's leasehold interest. The mortgage was to be retired out
of rents payable by the district under the re-lease arrangement. After
the debt was retired, the corporation would convey the leased premises,
including the new building and its equipment, to the district. The court
considered that the lease to the corporation, the re-lease back to
the district, and the mortgaging of its leasehold interest by the corpora-
tion must be viewed as one transaction, and not as three separate oc-
currences and held that the statute authorized the district to become
indebted in a manner contrary to the constitutional inhibition.2 9
III. Obligation of the city to pay
In Fowler v. City of Superior,3" the bonds unconditionally and
absolutely charged the city to be indebted to the bondholders, but the
bonds were to be payable out of the proceeds of improvement assess-
ments. It was argued that payment was to be looked for from the
assessment fund and not from the city itself, and therefore the city
should not be considered to have incurred a debt. The court an-
swered that the bondholders were not limited to receiving payment
only from the assessments. The fact that the bonds were charge-
able to something other than the general treasury of the city
merely gave more security to the bondholder, but did not change
the fact that the debts were still those of the city. The bondholder was
held to be entitled to payment out of the general fund of the city and
to be able to use the assessments as additional security for the payment
of the debt.
Using the loophole of the Stedman case, i.e., that the city could be
held to have no obligation to pay, Burnham v. City of Milwaukee3
sanctioned a method of purchase which would not constitute the cre-
ation of an indebtedness. The city needed land for parks and therefore
purchased some land on credit and gave instruments creating a lien on
the land to the seller. The court held that a "debt" denotes "not only an
obligation of the debtor to pay, but the right of the creditor to receive
and enforce payment."3 2 The contract did not expressly bind the city
to make the payments, as was the case in Fowler, but, as the court
stated, the city could stop payments and the creditor could not enforce
payment out of any city money or lands. The creditor could retake
the property, but this was not city property since title to it would
not pass until all the installments were paid. The court concluded that
29 For a complete discussion of lease-financing, see: Magnusson, Lease-Financing
By Municipal Corporations As a Way Around Debt Limitations, 25 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 337 (1957). Even if the use of lease-financing as a method of
acquiring municipal property might be less desirable economically than the use
of municipal bonds, the conflict between the needs of the municipality and the
debt limitations forces the cities, school district, etc., to chose the former.
30 85 Wis. 411, 54 N.W. 800 (1893).
3198 Wis. 128, 73 N.W. 1018 (1897).
32 Id. at 132.
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"It will not do to say that [the city] ... will probably make the pay-
ments, or that it would be foolish not to do so, but we must be able to
say that it has contracted, either expressly or impliedly, to do so."3
In Connor v. City of Marshfield," the city purchased property and
assumed a $125,000 mortgage existing on the property. The court held
that the city, in so doing, did not increase its indebtedness by the
amount of the mortgage, since it was not obligated to pay. The creditor
could only take back the mortgaged property if the payments were not
kept current. Thus, the rationale of the Burnham case was extended to
the assumption of mortgages. 35
IV. Obligation of the city on the purchase of income-producing utilities
This method of circumventing the debt limitation, an off-spring of
the Burnham ruling, was first considered in State ex rel. Morgan v.
City of Portgage.38 In this case an action was brought to compel the city
to comply with an order of the railroad commission directing the
making of improvements in its waterworks system. The city contended
that to do so, it would have to exceed its debt limit, but the petitioner
alleged that the city could comply with the order by availing itself of the
provisions of a certain statute.37 The statute provided for the creation
of a purchase-money lien on the utility and the application of the
revenue it produced for the payment of the expense of its operation,
depreciation, and the cost of acquisition or construction, without
creating an indebtedness of the city. The court held that insofar as the
statute authorized the acquisition and construction of public utilities by
cities and granted them power to provide for the issuance of bonds to
be paid out of the income and revenue of such utility in the manner
prescribed, this would not create an indebtedness of a city. However,
the court disallowed the use of this statute to authorize the issuance of
bonds for improvements to public utilities, unless such improvements
were made simultaneously with its acquisition or construction. The
court's reasoning was that once the mortgage for the acquisition or con-
struction of the utility had been paid off, the utility became municipal
property and as such could not be mortgaged without the city itself
incurring an indebtedness. The holding in this case regarding the
3 Ibid.
- 128 Wis. 280, 107 N.W. 639 (1906).
35 In reviewing the "no obligation" theory, the language of the Burnham de-
cision that it will not do to say that the city will probably pay or would be
foolish not to becomes suspect. The fact remains that it is most probable that
the city will pay and that the taxpayers will be burdened with this obligation.
By not calling it an indebtedness, this allows the city to create another debt
and thus subject the taxpayers to increased burdens.
36 174 Wis. 588, 184 N.W. 376 (1921). See also: Morris v. Ellis,.221 Wis. 307,
266 N.W. 921 (1936).
37 Wis. STAT. §927-19b, repealed in 1921.
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financing of improvements was changed by the previously mentioned
1932 amendment. 38
In Payne v. City of Racine,39 the plaintiff contended that the city's
proposed plan to extend an existing sewage system could not be financed
pursuant to the 1932 amendment. The reason he gave was that the term
"public utility," as defined in the statutes, did not include sewage sys-
tems. The court rejected this contention and held that, "The term 'public
utility,' as used in the foregoing amendment, must be considered to in-
clude all plants or activities which the legislature can reasonably clas-
sify as public utilities in the ordinary meaning of the term. '40
Subsequent to the 1932 amendment, a statute was enacted4' which
provided that the city could issue revenue bonds, without incurring in-
debtedness, for the purpose of restoring to its general fund monies
which it had provided by general taxation and disbursed for the purpose
of constructing, acquiring, extending, improving, and operating a water-
works system. This statute, and the method it prescribed, were held void
in Roberts v. City of JM'Iadison.42 The court considered that the 1932
amendment authorized the issue of bonds solely for the purposes con-
tained therein and not for the purpose of reimbursing the general fund
of the city. Since this method of avoiding indebtedness would not have
been valid prior to the amendment and since it was not protected by the
amendment, issuance of such bonds would be indebtedness of the city.
There was a strong dissent in the Roberts case in which the restric-
tive interpretation of the purposes for which such bonds could be issued
was attacked. It was also pointed out that even if the amendment should
be restrictively interpreted, the plan proposed by the statute would fairly
come within the category of management. "It is certainly within the
realm of managing a public utility to enable that utility to borrow
money at a lesser rate, which appears to be what will result if the pro-
posed bonds are issued." 43
38 See article, circa note 5.
39217 Wis. 550, 259 N.W. 437 (1935). See also: Flottum v. City of Cumber-
land, 234 Wis. 654, 291 N.W. 777 (1940).
40 Payne v. City of Racine, 217 Wis. 550, 555, 259 N.vV. 437 (1953). The 1932 amend-
ment was held to authorize the issuance of bonds for a hospital addition,
which would not be considered indebtedness of the city, in Meier v. City
of Madison, 257 Wis. 174, 42 N.W. 2d 914 (1950). The court struck down
the plaintiff's contention that since the city leased the hospital to an inde-
pendent association, the hospital was not operated as a municipal utility and
therefore not eligible for financing as such.
41 Wis. STAT. §66.06(9) (b) (13) (1945), renumbered §66.055(2) (in) by Wis.
LAws 1947, ch. 362, repealed by Wis. LAWS 1951, ch. 560.
42250 Wis. 317, 27 N.W. 2d 233 (1947).
43M. at 328. The majority opinion discussed the management theory and held:
"The word 'management' is not found in the amendment of 1932. Manage-
ment is one thing and 'managing a public utility' of a municipality is another.
'Management' is a noun .... Managing a public utility is the act performed
by the one who is vested with the power of management. The provision
of the amendment of 1932 can mean no more than the right to create an
indebtedness for the purpose of hiring a manager." Id. at 324.
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V. Multiple taxing districts
In Lippert v. School District,44 the plaintiff sought to enjoin the
issuance of the school district's bonds on the theory that since the limits
of the school district were coterminous with those of the village of
Shorewood, the indebtedness of both should be added together to de-
termine the constitutional debt limit of the district. The court held:
It is clear that [the language of the constitution] . . . refers
to the individual indebtedness of each municipality mentioned
and not to the aggregate indebtedness of municipalities.
Each municipality mentioned in the constitution is author-
ized to borrow up to the limit of its indebtedness, not to that of
its and another municipality's indebtedness. Each municipality
is a separate entity qualified to borrow and is separately liable
for its indebtedness. 4
5
The question was again litigated in Fort Howard Paper Co. v. Town
Board.46 The plaintiff sought to set aside the action of the town board
creating and establishing a storm sewer district.4 7 It contended that the
statutes authorizing such creation"8 were unconstitutional in that they
allowed the sanitary district to borrow money and issue municipal ob-
ligations up to the constitutional debt limitation independently from
that of the city and thus evade the constitutional provision. The court
cited the Lippert decision and held:
In the instant case there can be no valid claim that the town
sanitary district was created for the purpose of evading the con-
stitutionally imposed debt limit. Therefore, when the power to
create town districts and the power to borrow money and issue
municipal obligations is used in strict conformity with legislative
standards prescribed in the statutes, there can be no unconstitu-
tional delegation of power.4 9
VI. Ordinary running expenses of a municipality
Herman v. City of Oconto5" is authority for the proposition that
44 187 Wis. 154, 203 N.W. 940 (1925).
45 Id. at 155. The Lippert case cited State ex rel. M-farinette, T. & W. Ry. Co. v.
Tomahawk Common Council, supra note 18, in support of this holding.46266 Wis. 191, 63 N.W. 2d 122 (1954).
47 This action of the town board raises an interesting problem of governmental
structure. Some consider it a basic tenet that the governing bodies should be
kept simple and voter controlled. But, because of the burden of the con-
stitutional limitation, many municipalities must create these additional dis-
tricts. Quaere: Is it better to cause complexity of governmental structure or
to raise the percentage of limitation?
48 WIS. STAT. §§60.30 to 60.309 (1959).
49 Supra note 46, at 197. In the Fort Howard Paper Co. case, the sanitary dis-
trict sought to be created was a town-wide one. There were other sanitary
districts with less coverage already existing in the town, but the court held
this to be immaterial, since it did not appear that either of the previously
organized districts had ever acted upon or exercised the power of installing
stormwater sewers, which was to be the sole purpose of the newly created
sanitary district.50 110 Wis. 660, 86 N.W. 681 (1901).
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contracts for the ordinary running expenses of a municipality, which
bear no interest and which exist for a year or less, do not constitute
indebtedness within the constitutional provision. No tax is required to
be levied to pay off such contracts. The city incurred an obligation in
the Herman case, it is true, but the court considered that the type of
obligations contemplated by the constitutional provision were obligations
which projected payment into the future (over one year) and which
were to be paid off from receipts of taxation.
The Herman case also considered the problem of whether a contract
for a series of years, paid for by annual payments, such as a teacher's
contract, is to be taken as a whole in determining the amount of indebted-
ness. Stedman v. City of Berlin5' held that only the amount that became
due within the year was to be included as indebtedness for that year.52
In the most recent Wisconsin case dealing with municipal debt
limitation law, the school district, pursuant to statute,53 attempted to
procure a short term loan to meet its current operating expenses. 54 The
defendant declined to loan the money because the district was already
indebted up to its constitutional limitation. The statute provided that
when the district had become entitled to taxes levied, it could procure
short term loans and secure them by assigning the right to the taxes
without incurring indebtedness under the constitutional provision. The
city had become entitled to the taxes and the court held that the rule in
Earles v. Wells 55 made it possible to have such a statute without contra-
vening the constitution. (For a discussion of when the city is entitled
to the taxes for debt limitation purposes and the use of taxes as off-sets,
see infra, under the heading, "VIII. Taxes as off-sets to indebtedness.")
VII. Invading special funds
In Rice v. City of Milwaukee,56 the city attempted to use money set
aside in a special fund as an off-set to its indebtedness. The court dis-
approved of this method and held that when a fund is established, it
could not be used for any other purpose than that for which it was es-
51 Stedman v. City of Berlin, supra note 25.
52 See also: Prueher v. City of Bloomer, 241 Wis. 17, 4 N.W. 2d 186 (1942);
Meier v. City of Madison, 257 Wis. 174, 42 N.W. 2d 914 (1950). In regard
to the ordinary running expenses of the municipality and the municipal debt
limitation in Wisconsin, the reader is referred to Hirschboeck, Municipal
Current Expenses and the Debt Limit, 19 MARQ. L. REV. 59 (1935).
53 WIS. STAT. §67.12(8a) (1959).
54 School District v. Marine Nat. Exchange Bank of Milwaukee, 9 Wis. 2d
400, 101 N.W. 2d 112 (1960).
55 "So long as the current expenses of the municipality are kept within the
limits of the moneys and assets actually in the treasury, and the current
revenues collected or in process of immediate collection, the municipality
may be fairly regarded as doing business on a cash basis, and not upon
credit-even though there may be for a short time some unpaid liabilities."
94 Wis. 285, 297, 68 N.W. 964 (1896). [Emphasis added.]
56 100 Wis. 516, 76 N.W. 341 (1898).
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tablished. By taking money from that fund to pay other debts, a new
debt would be created by the city in favor of this special fund.
In an attempt to circumvent the Rice rule, the school district, in
Riesen v. School District,57 took taxes that were levied for a special
purpose and intermingled them in the district's general fund. The court
held that these funds could not be used as an off-set to the district's in-
debtedness, since these funds were earmarked, regardless of the fund
in which they were placed.
VIII. Taxes as off-sets to indebtedness
The use of taxes as an off-set to indebtedness stems from language
in Earles v. Wells:
[T]he moment an indebtedness is voluntarily created 'in any
manner or for any purpose' with no money or assets in the treas-
ury, nor current revenues collected or in process of collection for
the payment of the same, that moment such debt must be con-
sidered in determining whether such municipality has or has not
exceeded the constitutional limit of indebtedness.5 8 [Emphasis
added.]
In Rice v. City of Milwaukee,5 9 the city tried to use anticipated re-
ceipts of liquor licenses as an off-set. The court held that they were not
in the process of collection and could be collected only at the will of
parties seeking certain privileges. "The 'revenues' mentioned in this
decision [Earles case6"] had reference only to such revenues as the cor-
poration had levied, and had a legal right to enforce, regardless of any
one's will or pleasure .... [T]hese unknown and unascertained items
of income should not and cannot be considered as offsets against the
city's indebtedness.""'
The "process of collection" was more clearly defined in Balch v.
Beach:"2 "Taxes in immediate process of collection do not include taxes
merely voted. Taxes are not in immediate process of collection till the
tax roll shall have been placed in the hands of the proper collecting of-
ficer with authority to receive, and with the right of the taxpayer to pay,
the tax." 63
In City of Eau Claire v. Eau Claire Water Co., 4 the amount of the
special assessments had been levied and were in the process of enforced
5' 192 Wis. 283, 212 N.W. 783 (1927).58 Supra note 16, at 299.
59 Supra note 56.
60 [A] municipality's capacity for doing business on a cash basis, with out-
standing liabilities, is necessarily measured by the amount of cash on hand
and the available assets and resources readily convertible into cash to meet
the payment of such liabilities as they become due." Earles v. Wells, supra
note 16, at 298-99.61 Supra note 56, at 521-22.
62 119 Wis. 77, 95 N.W. 132 (1903).
63 Id. at 82.
64 137 Wis. 517, 119 N.W. 555 (1909).
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collection. The only thing that cast doubt on the legality of using these
taxes as an off-set was the fact that the process of collection was par-
tially protracted over a period of four years. The court questioned
whether this constituted "in the process of immediate collection." The
court, on the authority of the Earles case, held that since the assessments
were duly levied upon specific real estate and constituted liens that could
be sold by the city, they constituted a present available asset for use as
an off-set.
PRESENT WISCONSIN LAW
It is evident from the above discussion that some attempts to evade
the constitutional provision have succeeded while others have failed.
What can be deduced from the above cases is that there is a continual
struggle of municipalities to meet the demands of present day needs
and costs and yet remain under the constitutional debt limitation. There
are, no doubt, many good reasons for attempting to circumvent the pro-
vision, but according to State ex rel. Rogers v. ililligan,6 5 judicial
change is not the proper remedy:
The limiting of the amount of the indebtedness which may be
imposed upon a community is a rule which public opinion at the
time of the writing of the constitution required to be written into
that instrument. It was the purpose to fix limitations with respect
to liabilities within which the representatives of the people were
to conduct the government. It was not the intention of the writers
of our constitution to finally end things in a definite and static
state bound to then existing conditions, but it is apparent that if
the people are the authorities over the constitution, we are bound,
when moving from one basic plan to another, to move in that di-
rection through the deliberate and thoughtful processes of con-
stitutional amendment. 6
Since the Rogers case in 1954, there has been only one significant case
regarding municipal debt limitations, School District v. M1iarine Nat.
Exchange Bank of Milwaukee,6 7 and this case dealt with a construction
of a statute. Conversely, there have been three amendments added to
Art. XI, sec. 3, and three more proposed. Thus, present Wisconsin law
seems to be a process of constitutional amendment rather than one of
judicial interpretation.
Two observations can be made concerning the latest amendments
and proposed amendments. First, there seems to be an increasing aware-
ness of the plight of the school districts. The need for schools is much
greater now than it was fifty years ago. This need and the rising cost
85 Supra note 27.
66 Supra note 27, at 558. Substantially the same advocation was given in Magnus-
son, Lease-Financing by Municipal Corporations As a Way Around Debt
Limitations, 25 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 377, 396 (1957), and in a note in 18 IowA
L. REv. 269, 278 (1933). The basic premise of these advocations is that the
integrity of a constitutional provision, as it stands, should be maintained.
67 Supra note 54.
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of construction appear to have prompted the provisions increasing the
limitation percentages of school districts and towns authorized to issue
school bonds.
The second observation concerns the method of valuation of prop-
erty to determine what the limitation will be. The 1874 amendment pro-
vided that the debt could not exceed "five per centum on the value of
the taxable property therein, to be ascertained by the last assessment
for state and county taxes previous to the incurring of such indebted-
ness." Construction of this provision was given in School District v.
First Wisconsin Co.,," where the defendant, in a suit to compel the
purchase of bonds issued by the plaintiff, contended that the district had
exceeded its constitutional limitation of indebtedness. The facts in the
case showed that if the assessment made by the local assessor of Shore-
wood was to be taken as the basis of computation, the plaintiff had ex-
ceeded its limit, but if the assessment as equalized by the county board
was to be used, the limit was not exceeded. The district, naturally, con-
tended that the latter assessment was the one referred to in the con-
stitutional provision. On appeal, the court disposed of the plaintiff's
contention by citing State ex rel. Marinette, T. & W. Ry. Co. v. Toma-
hawk Common Council,'9 which held that the last assessment for state
and county taxes is "The last assessment of the town, city, or village
as fixed by the local board of review, upon which county and state taxes
may be extended, as well as local taxes . ... 7 The court then stated:
"We are satisfied that the previous ruling of this court correctly inter-
preted the constitutional provision in question and should be adhered
to." 71 The district also contended that the wording of the statute: "Every
reference to the value of the taxable property in a municipality, other
than a county, refers to such value according to the last equalized as-
sessment thereof for state and county taxes, . . .72 supported its con-
tention. The court held: "We are of the opinion that the words 'equalized
assessment' . .. means the assessment as fixed, corrected, or equalized
by the local board of review. This construction would make the con-
stitution and its interpretation by the court and legislature harmoni-
ous.'
7 3
The 1955 amendment, 74 as well as those that have followed, have
changed the 1874 provision so that the debt limit, in most cases, and in
all cases if the proposed amendments are added to the constitution, will
68 187 Wis. 150, 203 N.W. 939 (1925).
69 Supra note 18.
70 Supra note 18, at 93. This rule was also adhered to in Stedman v. City of
Berlin, supra note 25.
7 Supra note 68, at 153.
72 WIs STAT. §67.01(4) (1959). [Emphasis added.]73 Supra note 68, at 153.
7 See article, circa note 7. The validity of this amendment and the statutory
changes in Wis. STAT. §67.03 and §70.57 was established in State ex rel.
Thomson v. Peoples State Bank, 272 Wis. 614, 76 N.W. 2d 370 (1956).
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be determined from a percentage of the taxable property located in the
municipality "equalized for state purposes ... as provided by the legis-
lature." The legislature has so "provided" in Wis. Stat., sec. 67.03
(1959). Basically, it refers to Wis. Stat., sec. 70.57 (1959), which states:
(1) The department of taxation before September 15 of each
year shall complete the valuation of the property of each county,
city, village and town of the state. From all the sources of in-
formation accessible to it the department shall determine and
assess the value of all property subject to general property taxa-
tion in each county, city, village and town. It shall set down a list
of all the counties, cities, villages and towns, and opposite to the
name of each county, city, village and town, the valuation thereof
so determined by it, which shall be the full value according of
its best judgment.
This change, presumably, has the effect of standardizing the system of
evaluation in Wisconsin. Thus, municipalities will no longer be able to
regulate their debt limits by using differing systems of valuation. In
some instances, the change will result in a higher valuation, allowing
the municipality to increase its ability to borrow.
CONCLUSION
It is significant and commendable that Wisconsin has elected to
remedy the problems entailed in municipal debt limit law "Through the
deliberate and thoughtful process of constitutional amendment, '7 5 rather
than that "the scrutiny, ingenuity and ability for critical analysis of the
bar may hereafter discover some possible meaning [of the constitution]
beyond what now appears to be so clearly expressed. '76 Because of this,
the integrity of the Wisconsin constitution will be kept intact.
However, the election to proceed in this manner has imposed some
added responsibilities, especially on members of the Bar. One of the
contentions in State ex rel. Thomson v. Peoples State Bank7 7 was that
the explanation given to the voters before the election on the 1955
amendment was erroneous and misleading. This can be expected since
many laymen cannot comprehend the meaning of the language used in,
statutes and constitutions. Since there is a good possibility that three
amendments to Art. XI, sec. 3 will soon be up for a vote, and, if the
language in State ex rel. Rogers v. Milligan"8 is adhered to, more
amendments will be proposed and be subjected to a popular vote in
the future, the Bar should inform themselves so as to be able in turn
to inform the voting populace of the effect of such amendments. It
must be made clear to the voters that regardless of what is proposed,
the previously sanctioned methods of avoiding the limitation, especially
75 State ex rel. Rogers v. Milligan, supra note 27, at 558.76 Hebard v. Ashland County, supra note 13.
77272 Wis. 614, 76 N.W. 2d 370 (1956).
78 Supra note 27, at 558.
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lease-financing, multiple taxing districts, and contracts for the construc-
tion and improvement of income-producing utilities, will still be utilized.
It is only in this way that the people can make a rational decision in
regard to proposed amendments and thus be true "authorities over the
constitution."
ROGER E. WALSH
